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AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (13 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694324

30 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group, Period Ending 31 October 1969

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Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96243

AVGM-C

30 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CAFOR-65 (R-1)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

I. OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES, HEADQUARTERS, 4TH PSYOP GROUP:

1. General:

a. A significant stride was made in the area of local national hire. As a result of a letter written to the USARV Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, 4th PSYOP Group was allowed to hire local national personnel up to the hiring ceiling of 162. This, in effect, lifted the "freeze" on local national hire and eased a serious problem which had been facing the Group.

b. During the reporting quarter, the concept of a personnel services team was made an operational reality. The team made two visits to subordinate organizations, the 7th Battalion and B Co, 8th Bn in Pleiku, in conjunction with the Pre-AGI inspections. With them the team brought all records of personnel in the units visited, and such services were performed as issuance of ID cards, review of records, and counseling of personnel concerning questions on personnel actions. The team consists of one E7, 71H40, one E5, 71H30, and one E4, 71H20. The team will provide a full range of on-the-spot personnel services to the individual serviceman, as well as advice and assistance to commanders in all personnel matters. Scheduled visits will be made to each subordinate unit within the Group on a bi-monthly basis, and additional visits will be made as requested.

d. During the quarter four (4) men were reported wounded in action (WIA). 2LT Joseph W. Spooner of the 7th PSYOP Battalion and ARVN Interpreter SSG Mai Ding Lat were wounded as a result of a mortar attack which occurred while they were on a patrol mission with an element of the III

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694324
Inclosure

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Marine Division. FMIAR reports were received on SSG Bennie R. Wells and SF4 Dale L. Trammer, both of the 6th PSYOP Battalion, as a result of their 1/2 ton truck having ran over a mine on a PSYOP mission. A SMITE report was received on SP4 Donald L. Fett, also from the 6th PSYOP Battalion. SF4 Fett, returning from a PSYOP mission was hit by fragments from a hostile claymore mine.

d. The 4th Group experienced a large rotation of field grade officers during the reporting quarter. The quarter witnessed the departure of the following field grade officers: LTC Willie O. Latton, CO, 10th Battalion; LTC William Jacobs, CO, 5th Battalion; LTC Raymond Beitch, CO, 6th Battalion; MAJ Michael Fortini, CO, 7th Battalion, and MAJ James Farris, XO, 7th Battalion. Newly arrived officers and their assignments are as follows: LTC Don Booz, Group A0; LTC Gerhard L. Jacobson, CO, 7th Battalion; LTC James R. Warren, CO, 10th Battalion; LTC Marlin C. Lang, CO, 5th Battalion; MAJ Darryl R. Henn, Chief, Group FDS; MAJ R.K. Harris, Group S4; MAJ James M. Riley, Group S2; MAJ James E. Dierricks, A0, 7th Battalion; MAJ David A. Arzate, S3; 10th Battalion; and MAJ Donald L. Lyman, CO, CO 2, 5th Battalion. Other major staff changes were a move by LTC Barker from Group A0 to CO, 6th Battalion, and a move by MAJ Ciarel B. Mapes from S3, 10th Battalion, to Group S3.

2. PSYOP Development:

a. During the quarter, Group initiated a program of providing fact sheets on GVN programs to the battalions and field teams to enhance their ability to effectively develop PSYOPS material in support of these programs. Fact sheets that have been researched and developed are as follows:

- (1) GVN Pacification Program.
- (2) GVN Land Reform Program.
- (3) Village Self-Development Program.
- (4) Refugee Programs.
- (5) Tet 1970 - Year of the Dog.

Research was initiated on additional Fact Sheets dealing with People's Self-Defense Forces, GVN Economic Progress and Programs, Background on the 1970 GVN Elections, and Holidays and Significant Dates. Translations of these fact sheets in Vietnamese will be furnished as appropriate.

b. The major PSYOP development effort by Group for this period was in support of the Tet 1970 campaign. Two posters, two mini-posters, nine

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

leaflets, two pocket calendars, a Leaflet-At-A-Glance series, and two handbills were developed. Additionally, special items such as a bookcover, paper hand-puppet, stationery, a greeting, and a flexogram were designed. The specialty items and posters and handbills were designed for hand distribution among the civilian populace to support the overall Tet Themes of peace, prosperity, and happiness. Individual items recount accomplishments of the past year and encourage united support for GVN programs. Leaflets and pocket calendars were developed for air dissemination and are directed toward VC and NVA troops. Leaflets oriented toward the VC stress the benefits of the Chieu Hoi program, reunification with families, and describe how and why to rally. Items tailored toward NVA forces offer a better life and emphasize the choice of a new road in the Spring.

c. A significant accomplishment occurred in September when representatives of the RVNAF General Political Warfare Department, MACJ3-11, and 4th PSYOP Group agreed to form a national level PSYWAR coordination system. A PSYWAR Policy Committee consisting of senior representatives of these agencies will be responsible for assessing situations of PSYOP exploitation, establishing policies, and evaluating PSYOP programs. The committee meets monthly under the chairmanship of MG Trung, Chief, GPWD. In October several working level meetings were conducted to establish the missions working procedures of a combined national level Army PSYWAR Coordination Center.

d. Monitoring of the GVN Land Reform Program continued in coordination with the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture. During the month of August leaflets were developed to support the "Land Freeze" and government redistribution of land. MACJ3-11 is controlling the 4th PSYOP Group support to the Land Reform Program and, at present, is holding in reserve the commitment to develop three (3) more leaflets to support the "Land-To-The-Tiller" phase and the Montagnard Land phase.

e. Eleven (11) leaflets were developed to build the image of Vietnamese Armed Forces. This included not only the RVNAF forces, but also the People's Self Defense Forces with emphasis on civic action projects being conducted. The THONG CAM magazine also supported this objective and has published articles on the Naval forces of Vietnam, armed forces uniforms, and the Vietnamese Air Force.

f. Materials were developed for the Mid-Autumn Festival (Tet Trung Thu) to include a leaflet targeting enemy troops with a nostalgic theme and a leaflet for children which briefly outlines the tradition associated with the festival. A cut-out lantern kit was also prepared for hand distribution. This included a 3-color lantern with assembly instructions and directions for making a candle holder.

g. At the request of MACJ3-11, the 4th PSYOP Group reviewed the

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existing series of leaflets supporting B-52 bomber operations. A series of nine (9) leaflets was redeveloped with the intent that they be employed in post strike activities and as general warning leaflets to be dropped in contested and enemy held areas. The basic objective is to induce rallying to the GVN by capitalizing on the fear produced through the bombings.

h. Upon the death of North Vietnam's President, Ho Chi Minh, a quick-reaction leaflet was developed on a factual news-type basis announcing his death. The factual reporting was determined as the best approach in this instance in order to gain primacy and credibility without exposing our position to a counter-productive reaction.

i. THONG CAM magazine continued its support toward improving understanding among U.S. employers and Vietnamese employees. Although this basic purpose continues, increasing emphasis is being placed on publicizing nation-building efforts in the areas of economic growth, governmental actions, educational institutions, and new industry. The THONG CAM staff completed preparation of a reader survey for distribution to 400 employees as selected through the resources of local Civilian Personnel Offices. Additionally, a six-month projection of THONG CAM objectives and articles was prepared for the information of US Force Commanders and subordinate organizations.

j. During the reporting period the Testing and Evaluation Branch reviewed approximately 300 PSYOP items. Of this figure, 260 were found to be suitable for dissemination as received, or suitable with recommended changes. The Testing and Evaluation Branch noted during this quarter that a significant number of printed items continued to be judged unsuitable because of photos that do not correlate to the text or are too dark for proper recognition. A favorable trend noted was an increased use of more personal approaches in leaflet writing instead of using stock pro-GVN or Chieu Hoi phrases. The use of natural tone in terms of message style was considered more effective by the 4th PSYOP Group panel.

3. Operations - 4th PSYOP Group Hqs:

a. During the quarter, the 4th PSYOP Group Hqs printing facility printed a total of 595,096,000 6"x3" leaflet equivalents. Leaflets were distributed as follows:

6th PSYOP Bn	96,134,500
7th PSYOP Bn	245,535,500
8th PSYOP Bn	101,200,000
10th PSYOP Bn	59,769,000
JUSPAO	22,400,000
GPWD	53,907,000
Land Reform Agency	4,200,000

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b. Pleiku Radio Station:

(1) The Radio Team continued broadcasting daily per schedule, from 0530 to 1000 and 1825 to 2400 hours in Vietnamese and Montagnard dialects. Throughout most of the quarter the radio set operated at high power, but near the end of October generator failure made high power operation impractical and the Radio set switched to low power programming. This was repaired and the radio station resumed broadcast at high power (50,000 watt). Critically needed are spare 75-KW generators. At present the Radio Team does not have any spare generators. If one generator becomes non-operational the station can broadcast only at low power. The Sacramento Army Depot had indicated that a 75-KW generator could be shipped on 27 October; however, it has not arrived. A tracer action was initiated.

(2) It was determined that 500 feet of 20,000 volt wire now being used, while adequate, should be replaced with higher voltage (30,000) wire to achieve best results. A request was made for direct procurement by Electronics Com and in Philadelphia.

(3) Engineer personnel continued to work on the site bunker to prevent water leakage. A different drainage system is being installed as a means of carrying away excess water from around the bunker.

(4) Mr. Warren Reback, technical specialist from the Sacramento Army Depot, determined that the synthesizer that generates the initial carrier band for the site was becoming defective. Although adequate now, Mr. Reback recommended that to insure continued operations, a new synthesizer must be requisitioned. The synthesizer has been on requisition and a tracer action was initiated.

4. Logistics:

a. Critical Supplies - PSYOP:

(1) Alcohol, denatured, Grade 3: Several hundred gallons are on MILSTRIP requisition. Blanket wash is being used as a substitute.

(2) Recording Tape: At the beginning of the period this item was in critical supply. By the end of the quarter, however, sufficient quantities had been received.

(3) Deletion - Deglazing Solution: A QRP submitted for this item was cancelled by D BUSH Contract for the item was initiated in August but has not been received.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

b. PSYOP expendable Supplies: A concerted effort has been made the entire quarter to impress upon each unit within the Group that normal supply channels are to be exercised in the procurement of expendable supplies. Reliance on the QRP (Quick Reacting Procurement) system was materially reduced during the quarter. Numerous actions were accomplished in an effort to assist the battalion S-4's in using the established system and in building their confidence in that system. Usage of the standard MILSTRIP system by the Group Headquarters has already resulted in the receipt of Hess and Barker press parts, Addressograph/Multigraph press parts, Challenge Paper Cutter parts, printing inks, projector parts and a host of other expendable supplies used throughout the Group. The 4th PSYOP Group has been directed to stop all Direct Support activities, except for the support to the Pleiku Radio Station, by 31 December 1969, at which time the 1st Logistical Command will be fully capable of providing the DS and GS support as it does for other units. PSYOP Battalions in the field are presently establishing demands upon all appropriate DSU's. Aggressive action to make the system work will continue in preparation for the turn over of Group ASL stockage authority to the 1st Logistical Command on 31 December 1969.

c. Maintenance - PSYOP Equipment: Group spent the last quarter emphasizing the methods by which support may be obtained from maintenance units. It has written letters and made numerous staff visits to show each battalion S4 the way to get the most assistance from the supporting DSU. Group continues to maintain a repair section which is capable of repairing 1250 presses, vari-typers and Headliners.

d. Pleiku Radio: A new generator was flown in from Ft Bragg but it proved to be incompatible with the existing generators to power the set at high power. At the close of the reporting period, an overhauled generator from Sacramento Army Depot was on its way to give the station 4 75KW generator. One 75KW generator was inoperative the entire period for a faulty excitor generator. New excitor generators for that generator and for the other two 75KW generators were on requisition.

e. New Equipment: During the quarter the Group received five (5) varitypewriters, five (5) headliners, three (3) motion picture projectors, two (2) Challenge 370E 37½ paper cutters, 10 Addressograph/Multigraph 1250LW presses and a direct image photo processor 706Q. All equipment except the photo processor has been or will be distributed to the battalion which has the most pressing operational need. Within the next quarter new copy cameras and platemakers are expected to be received.

f. Fibreboard Boxes: The supply of fibreboard boxes was critical at the beginning of the quarter. By the end of the quarter an adequate supply of boxes had been found and a continuous flow initiated.

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30 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

II LESSONS LEARNED, OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Personnel: None.
2. Intelligence: None.
3. Operations:

a. Skills and Experience of Vietnamese Civilian Employees:

(1) OBSERVATION: On a recent trip to the Delta (Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien Provinces) an American research analyst was accompanied by Mr. Tran Van Hien, Vietnamese research specialist. Mr. Hien's assistance proved invaluable.

(2) EVALUATION: Mr. Hien's background as a Psywar Specialist and former Ranger Battalion CO, not only provided valuable Vietnamese insight into the subjects investigated but also provided a number of personal contacts who proved to be quite fruitful sources of information. Because an American officer and a Vietnamese specialist can provide each other with access to each other's organizations and contacts and at the same time compare Vietnamese and American outlooks on-the-spot, this combined trip proved to be extremely fruitful in obtaining information.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: A thorough analysis of the backgrounds, special skills and knowledge of all Vietnamese employees should be made by each organization having such employees. Whenever trips are planned to the field for the purpose of gathering information on which to base studies consideration should be given to having a Vietnamese national accompany the US personnel, not just as interpreters, but as valuable aides in making contacts and providing additional on-the-spot insights.

4. Training: None.
5. Logistics: None
6. Communications: None
7. Materiel: None
8. Other: None.

5 Incl

1. Gp HQ Organization Chart
2. 6th Psychological Operations Bn ORLL
3. 7th Psychological Operations Bn ORLL
4. 8th Psychological Operations Bn ORLL
5. 10th Psychological Operations Bn ORLL

T. K.T. GLD
COL, Armor
Commanding

AVHGC-DST (3 Dec 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, 25 JAN 1970
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Skills and Experience of Vietnamese Civilian Employees", section II, page 7, paragraph 1; concur. Existing civic action guidance stresses that Vietnamese nationals be used on projects to solicit their ideas and to be used as contacts. The coordination and application of the recommendation can be handled at local command level.

b. Reference item concerning "Operations", Inclosure 2, section I, page 3, paragraph 3f; concur. The employment of HK teams should depend upon the tactical situation and the commander's mission. If the local commander can best accomplish his mission by attaching AHE teams to the PSA, then the team should be attached. Attachments and detachments should be made by local commanders as the situation deems necessary.

c. Reference item concerning "Alternate Targets for PSYOP Support Aircraft", Inclosure 2, section II, page 5, paragraph 3a; concur. All battalions are now furnishing alternate targets within their CTZ, and in one case one flight supports two CTZs.

d. Reference item concerning "Staggered Schedule for PSYOP Air Support Missions", Inclosure 2, section II, page 5, paragraph 3b; concur. The coordination and application of the recommendation can be handled at local command level.

e. Reference item concerning "Communications between In-flight Aircraft and Ground PSYOP Unit", Inclosure 2, section II, page 5, paragraph 3c; concur. The coordination and application of the recommendation can be handled at local command level and 4th PSYOP GP. The recommendation should be written into communications SOP.

AVHGC-DST (3 Dec 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS (SFOR-65 (R2)

f. Reference item concerning "Number of Personnel in Photographs", Inclosure 2, section II, page 6, paragraph 3e; concur. This information has been disseminated to all propaganda development centers by the 4th PSYOP GP.

g. Reference item concerning "Quick Reaction (QR) Designation for Leaflet Requests", Inclosure 2, section II, page 7, paragraph 3f; concur. Guidance on QR designations are contained within existing directives and regulations.

h. Reference item concerning "Leaflet Requests Made Invalid and Non-useable due to Lack of Information", Inclosure 2, section II, page 7, paragraph 3h; concur. However, coordination should be handled at the local command level.

i. Reference item concerning "Lack of Interpreter on Propaganda Audio Visual Teams", Inclosure 2, section II, page 8, paragraph 3i; concur. Coordination should be established with the CORDs advisors and other agencies in the HE team's area of operations to have a source of back-up interpreters or tapes. 4th PSYOP GP should establish policy and guidelines on acquiring back-up interpreters.

j. Reference item concerning "Field Training of Vietnamese Volunteers", Inclosure 2, section II, page 8, paragraph 3k; concur. Training of Vietnamese volunteers enhances the unit's capabilities and improves US-VN relationships. Caution should be exercised in the training program to ensure that the unit's primary mission is not impaired.

k. Reference item concerning "PSYOP Intelligence from Interrogation of Hoi Chanh", Inclosure 2, section II, page 9, paragraph 3l; concur. Coordination of gathering intelligence from Hoi Chanh interrogations for PSYOP use should be undertaken directly between the unit commanders and the interrogation units.

l. Reference item concerning "Need for PSYOP-Peculiar Equipment Repairmen at Depot", Inclosure 2, section II, page 9, paragraph 6; nonconcur. 1st Log Comd has directed that the Field Force headquarters establish direct support maintenance facilities for PSYOP equipment. The 147th LEM Co has the responsibility for General Support maintenance of PSYOP equipment. If the units are having difficulty getting certain items repaired, it is recommended a knowledgeable individual accompany the item to the repair facility to lend assistance.

m. Reference item concerning "Give Away Items", Inclosure 3, section II, page 7, paragraph C1; concur. This is, indeed, a basic PSYOP principle and the very crux of de-emphasizing American presence and the recognition

AVHGC-DST (3 Dec 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

of GVN responsibility. Since all battalions are following this practice no action is required by this headquarters.

n. Reference item concerning "Face-to-Face Communications", Inclosure 3, section II, page 8, paragraph C2; concur. Whenever the tactical situation permits, PSYOP messages should be presented face-to-face. However, this can only be done when the enemy is not in the area in force. As pacification increases, face-to-face communication will become more possible. The ultimate goal is Vietnamese talking to Vietnamese.

o. Reference item concerning "Authorization to Draw Film", Inclosure 4, page 3, paragraph 2a; concur. Procedure recommended by 8th PSYOP Battalion to obtain authorization for issue of film is excellent advice. Group S4 has been advocating that all Battalions take this action for some time. Film received from local DSUs is generally fresher and supply is faster and more dependable. Specialized films used in lithographic platemaking process are not available, however, through the same channels. Only films appearing on Inclosure 2, Supply Management Newsletter #12-69, 1 Dec 69 (USA Inventory Control Center, Vietnam), are subject to request for authorization.

p. Reference item concerning "PSYOP Information Available at District Level", Inclosure 4, page 4, paragraph 2b; concur. In order to gain benefit from all sources of information, it is essential that liaison be maintained with the Vietnamese district intelligence agencies. The requirements for this liaison are recognized in existing guidance documents.

q. Reference item concerning "Improving the Quality of Media Development Field Requests", Inclosure 4, page 4, paragraph 2c; concur. Rejection of matter submitted by VN officials does not improve US-VN advisor-counterpart relationships nor does it help the PSYOP program. Coordination should be initiated by local commanders with POLWAR units on the application of this recommendation.

r. Reference item concerning "Delayed Opening Leaflet (DOL)", Inclosure 5, page 5, paragraph 2b(2); concur. As pacification efforts increase, smaller areas to be targeted by leaflets are contested or VC controlled, therefore, fewer leaflets will be needed. At the same time the need for accuracy is increased. The importance of selective targeting and the bundle and DOL methods of leafleting are recognized in current PSYOP guidance.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

s. Reference item concerning "Hoi Chanh follow-up", Inclosure 5, page 5, paragraph 2b(3); concur. The logical publicizing of the Chieu Hoi program ultimately depends on showing the populace, and the enemy, that it is indeed a successful program. Budget considerations and individual psychological unwillingness to declare oneself as a former enemy, or allow that fact to be publicized, has hampered this goal. All battalions are acquainted with this problem as are GPWD and MACJ3-11.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



D. MURRAY

PT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
4th PSYOP GP

//

GPOP-DT (3 Dec 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Psychological Operations Group
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 FEB 70


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

Q. L. Shortt
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

GROUP HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION



* PROPAGANDA DEVELOPMENT SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96227

AVGM-6C

10 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R2))

Commanding Officer
4th PSYOP Group
ATTN: AVGM-C
APO 96243

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. General: Continuing to accomplish its mission of providing psychological operations support to the Free World Military Assistance Forces within III Corps Tactical Zone, the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion realized marked increases in both media production and aerial psychological operations support during the quarter. The battalion produced 577 new leaflets during the quarter, 113 of which were in response to quick reaction (QR) requests. In fulfilling its mission of providing and coordinating aerial psychological operations support the battalion was faced with a major redeployment of aerial support assets in this quarter which saw a reduction in the number of available aircraft, the replacement of tried and reliable U-10 with the unfamiliar O2-B aircraft, and the 6th Battalion gaining the responsibility for targeting the northern provinces of IV Corps Tactical Zone as well as all of the III Corps Tactical Zone. In spite of these changes and added responsibilities, the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion coordinated approximately 900 aerial missions over nearly 3,400 separate requested targets. Of these aerial missions 598 were in response to quick reaction requests involving in many instances the immediate diversion of in flight aircraft and the use of the Early Word system to exploit ralliers or support troops in contact. Towards the ever present goal of greater Vietnamization of the psychological operations effort within the III Corps Tactical Zone and the ultimate optimum in psychological operations support, particularly in pacification, the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion has initiated many new innovations during the past quarter. Among the proposed and enacted innovations were plans to place Propaganda Audio-Visual Teams (HE) with the Assistant Province Advisor/Psychological Operations at the province and district operating levels; the combination of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion Propaganda Development Center with its counterpart elements from the ARVN 30th POLWAR Battalion and III Corps Tactical Zone POLWAR assets within the Combined PSYWAR/PSYOP Coordination Center; and the formation of a Mobile Advisory Team to provide better support to the battalion's field teams and to provide a more timely feedback of field team successes and problem areas.

Incl 2

AVCM-6C

10 November 1969

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operations Report (1 Aug - 31 Oct 1969)

2. Personnel and Administration:

a. Promotions: During this quarter the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion promoted a total of forty-eight individuals. The breakdown of promotions is as follows:

To CPT 1	To SFC 5	To SP5 10
To 1LT 5	To SSG 4	To SP4 13
To MSG 1	To SGT 3	To PFC 6

b. Awards: During the reporting period the following awards and decorations were presented to 6th Psychological Operations Battalion personnel:

Legion of Merit	1	Vietnamese Honor Medal	15
Bronze Star Medal	3	Vietnamese PSYWAR Medal	1
Air Medal	7	Aircraft Crewman Badge	15
Army Commendation Medal	2		

3. Operations:

a. Quarterly Production Totals:

(1) Leaflets Printed:	63,485,962
(2) Leaflets Disseminated:	365,458,500
(3) Aerial Loudspeaker Hours:	810
(4) Aerial Missions Flown:	900

b. In order to allow the battalion commander greater command and control of organic field teams and to obtain current feedback on methods of operation and problems encountered by the field teams during the conduct of their PSYOP support missions, the 6th PSYOP Battalion formed a Mobile Advisory Team to make continuous coordination with the battalion field teams on a rotating basis. Providing the field team leader with advice on procedures and propaganda development as well as providing maintenance assistance on both vehicular and PSYOP equipment, the Mobile Advisory Team enables the field team to provide greater and more capable PSYOP support to its supported units and agencies. An additional benefit from the activities of the Mobile Advisory Team is that the team can advise and enlighten the G5 and S5 sections of the supported units as to the most effective and efficient utilization of the various field team assets. By providing additional PSYOP expertise to both the supporting and supported the Mobile Advisory Team enhances the overall effectiveness of PSYOP within the III Corps Tactical Zone.

AVGM-6C

10 November 1969

SUBJECT: Quarterly Operations Report (1Aug - 31Oct69)

c. The 6th PSYOP Battalion has assembled a dual set of the flight propaganda audio tapes used by the 9th Special Operations Squadron for quick reaction support missions. This enables the set presently in use for aerial missions to be brought in for repair or up-dating. The duplicate tape is cut when the original is produced thus providing a master set for reproduction, replacement and issue to new field teams as appropriate.

d. In order to increase user and field team capability to effectively order and utilize available stock leaflets the 6th PSYOP Battalion prepared a current content listing for all presently available leaflet mixes. This listing was given wide field distribution during the past quarter and will provide using units much greater latitude in selecting printed media for both quick reaction and preplanned campaigns.

e. Towards greater Vietnamization of psychological operations within III Corps Tactical Zone and achieving the ultimate in effective propaganda development, the 6th PSYOP Battalion combined its Propaganda Development Center with elements of the 30th POLWAR Battalion and III CTZ POLWAR assets of the G5 section. Co-located in the Combined PSYWAR/PSYOP Coordination Center within the III CTZ compound the Combined Propaganda Development Center functions with a joint Propaganda Development Section, Testing and Evaluation Section, and Audience Analysis/Intelligence Section. Propaganda developed through this combined center is becoming increasingly meaningful, credible and effective due to the Vietnamese influence over message content, theme and illustration. Combining this increased content value with the US techniques of production and quality reproduction has resulted in the successful integration of all available propaganda development assets and capabilities focusing their concentrated efforts on a single objective of achieving the optimum in propaganda development.

f. The 6th PSYOP Battalion has proposed that the Propaganda Audio-Visual (HE) Teams currently under the operational control of major tactical units within III Corps Tactical Zone be removed from this status and placed under the control of the Assistant Province Advisor for PSYOPS in selected provinces of the III CTZ. 6th PSYOP Battalion studies and information sources indicate that increased PSYOP capabilities would be realized with the maintenance of a constant area of operations for the HE team rather than the current method of employment wherin the team must constantly change its area of operation and influence as the tactical unit moves. While the US unit would lose direct control of the team and influence over its operations, it is strongly felt that the US unit and all PSYOP agencies would benefit from the services available and rendered by a knowledgeable, area-oriented PSYOP team already established and functional in specific provinces and districts within III CTZ. Considering the fact that the HE team is primarily designed for pacification operations this proposal offers many advantages over current employment. By co-locating with the Assistant Province Advisor for PSYOPS the team would be able to maintain continual coordination and joint programs with the various Vietnamese agencies involved in pacification. Another distinct advantage is the opportunity to establish and maintain rapport with the populace as well as GVN officials within the area of operations. Progress is being made towards eventual employment of the battalion's HE teams in this recommended manner.

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g. Contingency leaflets dealing with the possibility of future further troop reductions, redeployment or a unilateral cease fire have been developed by the 6th PSYOP Battalion. At present there are no plans to produce these leaflets for stock or dissemination; however, in the event these leaflets are required, necessary changes and up-dating will be made and the leaflets put into production.

h. A mobile interrogation team was established by the 6th PSYOP Battalion Propaganda Development Center. This team with facilities in a 2½ ton Van will travel throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone contacting Interrogation Prisoner of War Teams, unit S2 sections, and assisting the battalion field team in their field testing of printed media and liaison activities with the various intelligence gathering sources.

i. Concerted, concentrated efforts by joint US/GVN agencies supported by field teams and aerial psychological operations support from the 6th PSYOP Battalion realized gratifying success in the pacification program of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in Long Khanh Province during the reporting period. Intensive program of broadcasts, face-to-face communication and printed media were targeted at hamlets within the province that were rated "D" in the hamlet evaluation system. Themes which improved the image of the GVN and ARVN and stressed the Volunteer Informant Program were interlaced with equal portions of music and entertainment which gained the attention of the populace. The efforts of all concerned have proven worthwhile in that many hamlets were upgraded to a "C" rating during the campaign and positive proof of the benefits of joint US/GVN pacification programs was in evidence.

4. Training:

a. Of the thirty-five officers currently assigned to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, fifteen have had formal PSYOP training. This represents 40.5% of the total number of officers assigned.

b. During the last scheduled semester, two officers and four enlisted men were enrolled in after hours study courses.

c. The 6th Psychological Operations Battalion conducted training operations for ninety-two days during the reporting quarter.

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel: None

2. Intelligence: None

3. Operations:

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a. Item: Alternate targets for PSYOP aircraft support missions

(1) OBSERVATION: Programming PSYOP support aircraft to fly specific leaflet or loudspeaker missions may result in a number of mission aborts due to adverse weather conditions, friendly tactical air strikes, or artillery strikes. Thus, a significant number of flying hours and ground maintenance hours are used to no effective purpose.

(2) EVALUATION: A practical utilization of manpower and logistical air support could be accomplished if alternate PSYOP target areas could be determined and established on a regular basis. Pilots unable to complete their primary missions could then fly "general" PSYOP broadcast missions in these alternate areas.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is suggested that the battalions arrange for their air support units to fly predetermined alternate PSYOP targets if existing conditions force the main mission to be aborted. These alternate target areas could be determined on a regular basis by the PSYOP battalions. Thus maximum use of PSYOP air support would be accomplished regardless of unforeseen conditions in preplanned, primary target areas.

b. Item: Staggered scheduling for PSYOP air support missions

(1) OBSERVATION: When PSYOP support aircraft all leave for pre-planned missions at only two or three regularly scheduled times each day, all of the missions may be completed well before the next scheduled missions. Thus, in the event that a supported unit requires a quick reaction or "Early Word" mission to be flown, a special aircraft must frequently be dispatched from the ground for that purpose.

(2) EVALUATION: The staggering of PSYOP support flights will keep a number of PSYOP aircraft in the air for the greatest daily time-span. A unit requesting immediate support could then request that one of these aircraft be diverted to its area for the mission. This would also either partially or completely eliminate the necessity for keeping one aircraft on the ground in a standby capacity.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The possibility of staggering PSYOP flights on a daily basis should be discussed with PSYOP air support units. If it is possible to implement such a program, faster quick reaction support could be provided field teams and a more efficient employment of existing aircraft and crews could be effected.

c. Item: Communications between in-flight aircraft and ground PSYOP unit

(1) OBSERVATION: It is occasionally difficult for the air control personnel of PSYOP-supported field units to make radio contact with PSYOP aircraft - particularly in quick reaction situations - since a mutual frequency may not have been established.

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(2) EVALUATION: It is common practice for PSYOP aircraft to check with brigade level Tactical Air Control Parties for information concerning tactical air support, artillery strikes, etc. These TACPs are generally co-located with the Tactical Operations Center.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: If unable to achieve radio contact with PSYOP aircraft, air control personnel of field units may check with the TACP for their area to ascertain the PSYOP aircrafts frequency. The TACP may be able to contact the aircraft to establish a workable frequency.

d. Item: Chieu Hoi "sequence" approach successful for 199th LIR

(1) OBSERVATION: Immediate exploitation of a rallier with QR leaflets and extensive use of the "Early Word" system had a deep effect on an enemy unit in recent operations. The enemy unit commander took his personnel on a 12 hour forced march to drive the effect of the rallier and the PSYOP exploitation from their minds; nevertheless, a second member of the unit soon rallied and was utilized by the 199th in conjunction with the first rallier to continue intensive exploitation. Again this approach proved successful as the unit commander increased the physical punishment on his unit to prevent further rallying but still another member rallied.

(2) EVALUATION: Maximum and proper utilization of the Early Word system and QR leaflets to exploit Hoi Chanh's brings results, not only of an immediate nature, but also of a continuing value when each success is amplified and continued.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: By use of the Early Word system and QR leaflets each rallier can be exploited in conjunction with preceding and successive ralliers to place increasing and continuous pressure on enemy units during tactical operations.

e. Item: Number of personnel in photographs

(1) OBSERVATION: Leaflet requests accompanied by photographs of Hoi Chanh's, villagers, families, etc., in groups of three people have been submitted on occasion for propaganda development.

(2) EVALUATION: Testing and evaluation panel as well as several field teams have reported that the use of three personnel in one photograph is counter-productive because to many Vietnamese this is a symbol of bad luck.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Requesting agencies should avoid this oversight which could be counter-productive to the intent of the propaganda. Two or four people in one photo is acceptable but three should be avoided.

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f. Item: Minor Repairs to 16mm Projectors

(1) OBSERVATION: Many valuable hours and even days of field team operational missions are wasted by frequent breakdown of the 16mm projector organic to the HE team. Quite often it is only a minor fault or some "bug" in the mechanical function of the projector which is beyond the scope of 1st echelon repair but yet not so major as to warrant return to a repair facility.

(2) EVALUATION: Within the 1st Infantry Division area and in particular, Dau Tieng, HE teams have had great success keeping their projectors operating by utilizing the repair facilities found in the Special Services offices. While unable to handle major item repair or parts replacement, the Special Services personnel have been glad and willing to help the team in any way within their capability.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: HE teams confronted with minor faults and irregularities with their 16mm projectors should check with the nearest Special Services facility to make possible arrangements for their help and suggestions in correcting the faults. Team leaders are reminded that this is not a responsibility of Special Services but rather a gratuitous gesture which must be regarded and coordinated.

g. Item: Quick Reaction (QR) designation for leaflet requests

(1) OBSERVATION: Units are misusing the QR priority for leaflet requests by assigning this designation to a majority of their leaflet requests to assure the prompt fulfillment of their PSYOP operational needs.

(2) EVALUATION: A leaflet request labeled "QR" should definitely be needed immediately; eg, to exploit a rallier or support troops in contact.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: If requesting agencies do not completely and adequately justify the designation, QR, the request should be downgraded by the approving authority.

h. Item: Leaflet Requests made invalid and non-useable due to lack of information

(1) OBSERVATION: Using/requesting agencies still are not aware that the Vietnamese language is meaningless without the diacritical markings. Vietnamese proper names in particular are non-useable without these diacritical marks to assure correct identification and credibility.

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(2) EVALUATION: Units submit requests with names of ralliers sans proper diacritical marks, rally messages devoid of credible signature and general lack of valid information which either critically delays or completely voids the request.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Units must be made aware of this deficiency and the approving authority disapprove or return for correction all requests so lacking of necessary information.

i. Item: Lack of interpreter on Propaganda Audio-Visual Team (HE)

(1) OBSERVATION: The loss of the team interpreter through reassignment, discharge or whatever means can seriously hamper the effectiveness and operational capacity of the HE team.

(2) EVALUATION: In order to properly and successfully carry out its mission of pacification the HE team must be able to coordinate with the various Vietnamese agencies within its area of operations.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: If the team interpreter is lost, attempt to have a MACV interpreter or a member of VIS travel with the team in order to make the broadcasts and coordination. If one of these sources is unavailable for a certain day or period of time, have the VIS chief, CVN official or other appropriate individual tape his message and play this tape during team operation.

j. Item: Use of PSYOP Intelligence

(1) OBSERVATION: Experience has shown the value of psyop intelligence in planning and coordination of operations.

(2) EVALUATION: Close coordination with the S2 and other intelligence agencies enables using units and field teams to be constantly abreast of a changing situation and thus more able to react to a more rapidly exploitable information.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: Field teams and using units should make every attempt to integrate current intelligence into all psyop activities. This will help maintain maximum pressure on target audiences by virtue of flexibility which is based on valuable intelligence.

k. Item: Field training of Vietnamese Volunteers

(1) OBSERVATION: Where appropriate, field teams are attempting to persuade various Vietnamese agencies with whom they work to place a volunteer

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with the Propaganda Audio-Visual Team in order to provide volunteers with experience in the use of team equipment.

(2) EVALUATION: In the future, it is possible the Vietnamese will be given psyop equipment for their own use.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: If Vietnam is given its own psyop equipment it would be important to have personnel pre-trained in the use, care and maintenance of this equipment. To this end, field teams should continue to encourage Vietnamese participation.

1. Item: Psyop Intelligence from Interrogation of Hoi Chanks

(1) OBSERVATION: In many cases, interrogation of Hoi Chanh for Psyop related information comes after all other questioning.

(2) EVALUATION: When this is done, the Hoi Chanh is usually too brow-beaten and tired to accurately or willingly answer questions.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: More valuable information can be gained from Hoi Chanks if they are interrogated as soon as possible after rallying. Units should insure this because each Hoi Chanh rallys because of a different weakness and if this weakness is found it is exploitable immediately and possibly more persons from the Hoi Chanks group can be induced to rally.

2. Item: Leaflet Dissemination in Pacification Operations

(1) OBSERVATION: Civilian target audiences have been found to be more receptive to printed material when it is disseminated by hand.

(2) EVALUATION: Hand dissemination places distribution on a personal basis and implies importance to the material. When leaflets are thrown by the handfuls to the ground, the value is lessened because the target audience tends to attach the same significance and importance to the material as does the disseminator.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: Printed material used in pacification programs should be disseminated by hand and augmented with face-to-face communications.

3. Organization: None

4. Training: None

5. Logistics: Item: Need for PSYOP-peculiar equipment repairman at depot

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a. OBSERVATION: Many PSYOP-peculiar items of equipment are not immediately repairable in the field due to the lack of the specialized repair parts and tools necessary. Further delay is caused at depot level maintenance because of the lack of repairmen trained to repair PSYOP-peculiar equipment.

b. EVALUATION: Considerable time could be saved in repairing PSYOP equipment if the expertise of PSYOP-trained repairmen could be combined with the repair facilities and parts available at depot level maintenance.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That PSYOP Battalions give serious consideration to stationing one of their PSYOP-trained repairmen at their respective Light Equipment Maintenance facility for the specific purpose of expediting the repair of PSYOP-peculiar equipment.

7. Communications: None

8. Material: None

9. Other: None

Irving Barker

IRVING B. BARKER
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 7TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVG1-7C

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
ATTN: Force PSYOP Officer
APO 96602

TO: Commanding Officer
4th Psychological Operations Group
ATTN: AVG1-C
APO 96243

1. References:

- a. USARV Regulation 525-15, Subject as above, April 1968.
- b. 4th Psyop Group Reg 335-3, Subject as above, December 1968.

2. Submitted herewith is the Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned, for the period 1 August to 31 October 1969, prepared in accordance with the above references.

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a. I. / JACOBSON
ITC, FA
Commanding

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Section I: Operations - Significant Activities

1. The 7th PSYOP Battalion engaged in 274 hours of mandatory training during the reporting period. The training included weapons familiarization and CBR refresher training, which were administered to newly assigned personnel as part of the replacement training program. In addition, a briefing was given each new arrival to give him a basic working knowledge of the unit's organization, mission, capabilities, and support role in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) psychological operations effort. During the quarter, the battalion was engaged in 92 days of continuous operations. The unit participated in no troop movements other than the normal flow of replacements and supplies sent to the various field detachments. No major operations arose where the entire unit was responsible for overall support. A current organization chart is attached as Inclosure #1, and a list of the current field detachment locations is at Inclosure #2.
2. As a result of the troop replacements occurring in the I Corps Tactical Zone, this unit is redeploying the field teams currently under the operational control of the departing 3rd Marine Division. Elements of this unit's second detachment are involved. The field teams from this detachment have been placed under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and the 101st Airborne Division. The field team redistribution is shown in Inclosure #2. In addition, one recently activated Audio-Visual team has been added to the 1st Marine Division in response to increased requirements of that unit.
3. The Joint Propaganda Development Center (JPDC) is continuing to exploit the second phase of the troop replacement. During the month of October alone, twenty-three (23) additional propaganda items were developed on troop replacement. The majority of the items produced explained how and why the 3rd Marine Division is being replaced by the 1st ARVN Division. Other items developed on troop replacement, included Pro-Government of Vietnam slogans and posters designed to bolster the patriotism of the population residing within the 1st ARVN Division's new area of operations. At the same time, items were developed which explained to the local populace that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam is well equipped, and trained and also conveyed to the people the Government's determination to protect them from communist aggression. Catalog sheets of representative items appear as Inclosure #3.
4. During this reporting period, representatives of this unit, in coordination with Colonel Vinh, Chief of I Corps Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF), and Colonel Fisk, Senior Advisor of I Corps RF/PF, worked out the details for the 10th Political Warfare Battalion (ARVN) and the 7th PSYOP Battalion to jointly produce "Bung Sang", a troop indoctrination magazine directed toward the RF/PF soldier. The magazine is published twice monthly in 20,000 copies per edition and distributed via PCL/AR channels throughout the Corps area.

5. This unit held a Change of Command Ceremony on 15 September during which LTC Gerhard L. Jacobson assumed command of the 7th PSYOP Battalion from Major Michael R. Fortini. During the ceremony, which also honored the departing Executive Officer and Sergeant-Major, Major Fortini was awarded the Legion of Merit by BG Leo J. Dulacki III, Assistant Chief of Staff G3, III Marine Amphibious Force. Major James E. Dierickx is the new Executive Officer, and CSM James V. Oden the new Command Sergeant-Major.

6. Arrangements have been made by this unit to have the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) distribute the 12,000 copies of the Mien Trung newspaper produced twice weekly by the battalion. The newspaper text is prepared by the Regional VIS office, and it includes regional and national news. The arrangement will provide Corps-wide distribution of the newspaper, a copy of which is at Inclosure #4, in support of the pacification program and assure a wider distribution than had been possible previously.

7. During this reporting period, the northern half of ICTZ experienced severe rain and high winds as a result of Typhoon Doris, resulting in heavy flooding throughout the area. XXIV Corps G5 requested support from this unit in developing items directed at the local population to inform them of the danger of drinking water from wells polluted by the flooding. This unit modified an item developed by the Joint US Public Affairs Office (#1415), to fit the local situation. It was printed on a quick reaction basis in 5,000 copies and completed in six hours. It was then shipped to XXIV Corps by C2B aircraft. This item, a handbill, is for hand dissemination. 1 copy of the catalog sheet is attached as Inclosure #5.

8. In response to requests from the 101st Airborne Division, the 7th PSYOP Battalion developed a series of leaflets in an attempt to facilitate potential Hoi Chanks in finding a location to Chieu Hoi. The 101st Airborne Division established a total of five areas - 4 in the A Shau Valley and one south of Hue - which were marked by columns of smoke for easy identification. The leaflets developed to support this campaign included a map that showed the friendly locations and gave detailed instructions on how to Chieu Hoi. No positive results have been reported due to this campaign. Catalog sheets of the leaflets used are at Inclosure #6.

9. Effective 15 August 1969, due to the lack of funds, this unit discontinued the dissemination of leaflets in the Rewards Campaign. Affected items are all leaflets, handbills and posters denoting specific price lists for ordnance and munitions. This freeze does not, however, affect other campaigns, such as rewards for turning in enemy officials or assisting downed pilots.

10. This unit's Propaganda Development Center (PDC) completed the evaluation of twenty-three (23) enemy propaganda items during the reporting period and prepared a monthly Enemy Propaganda Analysis Report for submission to 4th PSYOP Group. On the same subject, a form was developed

and distributed to field personnel for their use in submitting enemy propaganda leaflets to PDC. This form has a space where the leaflet can be attached and space for certain pertinent information. A copy of this form is included as Inclosure #7. The I Corps Joint Propaganda Development Center (JPDC) has begun planning for the TET 1970 campaign. Items in support of this campaign are now in development and the JPDC will continue to develop materials through late December or early January. A total of one month's printing production spaced over the next four months will be devoted to the printing of TET materials by the S-3. In addition to those items being developed, it is anticipated that this Battalion will require PSYOP support materials from other than local sources. 4th PSYOP Group has been asked to provide this battalion with 150 million leaflets from off-shore sources and 10 million leaflets from Group headquarters. It was also requested that 4th PSYOP Group provide these materials not later than 30 days prior to TET to allow for timely dissemination.

At approximately 1000 hours, 22 August 1969, the 7th PSYOP Battalion received a request for leaflet development from the Americal Division, whose 196th Light Infantry Brigade was in heavy contact with the 1st and 3rd Regiments of the 2nd NVA Division. The theme of the leaflet was surrender or die. At the time the request was received, the enemy had lost 400 men by body count and the operation was continuing. In an effort to minimize the time required to develop the finished product, a line drawing which had been used as the back of another leaflet was used as the reverse side of the leaflet being developed. As the back of the leaflet was being chosen, an interpreter for the battalions' Joint Propaganda Development Center hand-lettered the message to be used on the front of the leaflet. This hand written text was photographed and prepared for printing. Printing the backs started at 1020 since the layout was available from the battalion files. By 1100 hours, the layout of the hand written text was completed and it too was put on the presses. By 1500 that afternoon, 120,000 leaflets (3x6) had been printed, cut, boxed and delivered to the waiting 9th SOS aircraft for drop on the target. The leaflet drop was accomplished by 1600. The total elapsed time between the initial request and the drop of 120,000 finished leaflets was five (5) hours. The catalog sheet of this item is at Inclosure #8. In addition to the above mentioned super quick reaction leaflet, this unit developed two (2) other leaflets on the same theme, catalog sheets of which are at Inclosure #9.

11. On 4 September 1969, Major Kim, (Republic of Korea Marine Corps) liaison Officer to III MAF, and Captain Do, ROKMC PSYOP Officer, met with 7th PSYOP Battalion personnel to coordinate PSYOP support for a combined ROKMC/USMC amphibious assault (Bold Mariner) to be held 12 September 1969, in the Barrier Reef area (Bm 2255). Because of the classified nature of the operation the complicated plan was kept in this unit's security section until 111800 September at which time the text and map of the leaflet desired were produced by hand by a trusted Vietnamese working on the night shift that evening. In order to complete security precautions, this individual was kept within this unit's compound until after this item was dropped. The leaflet, number 7-790-69, a catalog

sheet of which is attached as Inclosure #10, went to press at 1900 hours and 250,000 copies were dropped at 0730 hours the following morning, together with standard JUSPAO-produced safe conduct rally passes.

12. News of Ho Chi Minh's death was first heard in a radio broadcast on Armed Forces Vietnam Radio on the morning of 4 September 1969. The Chief and Assistant Chief of Joint Propaganda Development Center (JPDC) immediately began investigating possible exploitation of the subject but after careful consideration and receipt of guidance from the III Marine Amphibious Force PSYOP Officer, it was decided that no material would be developed pending receipt of guidance from Saigon. Guidance was received on the morning of 5 September and discussed that afternoon at a meeting of the I Corps Joint PSYOP Coordinating Committee and JPDC personnel. It was agreed by all present that the guidance received through American channels would be followed by both American and Vietnamese PSYOP agencies in I Corps. The guidance sent from Saigon was received by means of electrical message and was difficult for Vietnamese personnel to understand because of the format and style in which such a message is normally written. To facilitate understanding by Vietnamese personnel, the guidance was rewritten in the form of a list of DO's and DON'T's; that is, points to be exploited and emphasized and points to be avoided. This list was translated into Vietnamese and a copy given to each writer in JPDC for use in the development of propaganda. JPDC developed five leaflets on this subject. Because of the sensitivity of the subject and the strict guidance received, the text of the leaflets was limited primarily to an announcement of the death. Primary purpose of the leaflets was to inform the target audience of the death of Ho and to call for a reunification of the nation (See Inclosure #11). Prior to the printing, the leaflets were presented to the Joint Coordinating Committee for discussion and to LTG Lam (CG, I Corps) for approval.

13. The 7th PSYOP Battalion, in support of the 1st Marine Division, developed items during this reporting period exploiting documented cases of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army dissention, catalog sheets of which are at Inclosure #12. Extensive research into the exploitability of cases of such dissention is conducted to assure their credibility.

14. During the month of October 1969, a total of 764 persons rallied under the Chieu Hoi program in the I Corps Tactical Zone. This is the highest monthly total on record. Most of the ralliers did so in groups of five and six persons and two mass rallies were reported - one of 21 persons and one of 23 persons. The apparent reason for the significant increase in ralliers is the combination of Viet Cong Main Force and North Vietnamese units moving into the mountains and the Government of Vietnam expanding its control of the area through the establishment of new popular force outposts. These outposts provide the opportunity to rally with minimum risk of being detected. In addition, the departure of Main Force units probably created a feeling of being abandoned in the local Viet Cong.

15. During this reporting period, the 7th PSYOP Battalion has supported XXIV Corps and 101st Airborne Division in a rice denial campaign being conducted in northern I Corps. Four (4) leaflets were developed by the Battalion admonishing the local populace to assist the government forces in protecting the crops that the villagers have labored so diligently to produce from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army. Catalog sheets of these items are at Inclosure #13. More than six (6) million leaflets, including large quantities of standard rice denial leaflets were dropped in support of this campaign.

16. During this reporting period, the Nguyen Trai II Campaign was concluded. The campaign's objectives were all exceeded, as is discussed in detail in the after action report which appears as Inclosure #14.

17. In response to a request by Lt. General Nickerson, CG, III MAF, this unit developed three (3) leaflets and four (4) handbills exploiting the facts that: (1) Ho Chi Minh on a number of occasions has stated that he could win the war regardless of the number of casualties his forces sustained as long as his cadre men, or VCI, remained; (2) Mdm. Binh, the NLF's representative at the Paris Peace Talks, had stated in an interview that the government of Vietnam and Free World Military Forces were destroying the VCI in large numbers. A full campaign was undertaken to exploit these remarks, with the target audiences being first the VCI and second the VC/NVA line soldiers. Catalog sheets of the items developed, as well as an evaluation of the items by 4th PSYOP Group PDS, are at Inclosure #15. After Ho Chi Minh's death, PDC evaluated the entire campaign and determined that none of the items were usable.

18. This unit has identified a need for certain standard air tapes to be used in areas which are inhabited primarily by Hre, Bru, and/or Katu speaking Montagnard villagers. In cooperation with the G-5, Americal Division, and the PSYOP Officer, C Company, 5th Special Forces Group, this unit has arranged to fly interpreters fluent in these dialects to the tape making facility in this battalion for the purpose of producing a standard set of Montagnard tapes. The finished product will be stored at the 7th PSYOP Battalion S-3 Air Section, which is co-located with A Flight, 9th Special Operations Squadron. These tapes are also to be furnished G-5, Americal Division, and C Company, 5th Special Forces Group.

19. During the reporting period, the Battalion received an enemy hand printing press and fifteen (15) enemy propaganda documents that were captured by the Americal Division. The press consisted of a marble plate approximately 11" x 11" and two hand rollers. Most of the enemy propaganda items were directed at their own troops and called on them to defeat the American aggressors and the "puppet" (GVN) troops. Also included were booklets which contained instructions for writing propaganda, something similar to our policy guidances.

20. Printing production and development figures for this reporting period are up significantly from the same period in 1968.

	1 Aug 68	1 Aug 69
to	to	
<u>31 Oct 68</u>		<u>31 Oct 69</u>
Newly developed items:	196	292

During this reporting period, due to the loss of a number of pressmen, this unit returned to a two-shift workday. This factor, as well as the problems encountered with the lightweight paper issued to this unit, reduced the output capability of the unit. A detailed discussion of the causes is at Inclosure 16.

21. During this reporting period, the 26th and 27th PSYOP Detachments were transferred to the 6th PSYOP Battalion in accordance with instructions received from MACV/J3-11. These detachments, both Combat Loudspeaker Teams are three-man teams; however, only the equipment, not the personnel, was sent to the 6th PSYOP Battalion.

Section II - Commanders Observations and Recommendations:

Part I: Observation (Lessons Learned)

A. Personnel - None

B. Intelligence - None

C. Operations:

1. "Give Away" Items:

a. OBSERVATION: This unit's field detachments are provided with many items for hand out during psychological operations to include; shower shoes, children's T-shirts, school kits, and hygiene items such as soap and toothpaste. With a limited supply of these hand out items the problem is to determine the most effective manner of distribution that will produce a favorable psychological impact.

b. EVALUATION:

(1) The random distribution for a first come, first serve basis of these hand out items may not gain the desired effect for the following reasons:

(a) It is easy for such "charity" to appear as just another haphazard overflow of American opulence.

(b) Limitations in quantity preclude providing all people in a audience with an equal share of the items.

(c) Random distribution by an American team may make more enemies than friends, for example, random distribution of T-shirts to children who are not as needy as others.

(2) With more careful handling, it is felt that these "give away" items can be a useful PSYOP tool by distributing them through "key communicators" in the area of operations. The team leader could, for instance, give the T-shirts to the hamlet schoolteacher, explain that they are given as a show of friendship and concern for the children's well-being, and suggest that they be used to reward children for high scholastic performance. Items such as soap, rather than just being distributed to large audiences, could be used when a field team supports a Med Cap: while the team broadcasts information concerning personal hygiene and distributes leaflets with similar information, team members could give bars of soap to mothers along with instructions on the advisability of bathing children with soap to ward off disease and infection. This approach should seem more personal and less offending than "charity."

c. RECOMMENDATION: That hand out or "give away" items be distributed through "key communicators" to provide for an equitable distribution of the items and provide the maximum PSYOP impact.

2. "Face to face" Communication:

a. OBSERVATION: This unit has experienced more success with PSYOP messages presented "face-to-face" than those presented from a considerable distance.

b. EVALUATION: On numerous occasions local officials have told Combat Loudspeaker and Audio-Visual team members of this unit's detachments that the messages presented are infinitely more credible if presented as the teams play prerecorded messages while the teams travel down the roads.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That a concerted effort be made to present any and all PSYOP messages face-to-face, on an individual to individual basis.

D. Organization - None


E. Training - None

F. Logistice - None

G. Communications - None

H. Material - None

I. Other - None



Incl 1 to Incl 3

FIELD TEAM LOCATIONS

1. Detachment #1 (1st Marine Division)
3 Audio-Visual Teams
3 Combat Loudspeaker Teams
2. Detachment #2 (1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech))
1 Audio-Visual Team
2 Combat Loudspeaker Teams
3. Detachment #3 (Americical Division)
2 Audio-Visual Teams
3 Combat Loudspeaker teams
4. Detachment #4 (101st Airborne Division)
3 Audio-Visual Teams
4 Combat Loudspeaker Teams

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Inclosure #2 to Incl 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 8TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96240

AVGM-8C

10 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned; HQ, 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R2)

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1. Section I - Operations, Significant Activities:

a. Personnel. Officer rotation continued at a high level, resulting in extensive changes in key positions including a change of Battalion Commander, Battalion Executive Officer, Commanding Officer of Company A, S-1, S-2 and S-3. Key enlisted changes included Battalion Sergeant Major and Company A First Sergeant. Seven of the 8th PSYOP Battalion's twelve HE (Audio-Visual) Teams have received new team leaders within the reporting period. Five of the seven officers are Vietnamese language qualified.

In September, the battalion was augmented with two Audio-Visual teams from the 10th PSYOP Battalion. The teams have been designated 10E/AVG1 and 10E/AVG2 and are employed in Lam Dong and Khanh Hoa Provinces, respectively. The 8th PSYOP Battalion Organization Chart is attached as inclosure 1.

b. Intelligence. A special campaign, which combines the intelligence, propaganda production and delivery capabilities of the District Advisory Team, the 8th PSYOP Battalion and supporting air assets is being developed and implemented in Ham Thanh District, Binh Thuan Province. One battalion intelligence sergeant and one Vietnamese sociologist were sent to the District Headquarters to coordinate and control the project under the direct supervision of the District Advisor. The battalion has gathered all the preparatory intelligence and is now continuing with information and operational support in the exploitation phase. The PSYOP objectives, based upon the current situation within the district, have been carefully selected and associated with specific target audiences. Preplanned aerial loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination missions are flown daily; face to face communication on the ground is used to give credence to the aerial targeting.

Incl 4

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Four special reports were initiated during the reporting period and were distributed to users within the 8th PSYOP Battalion and II Corps Tactical Zone. One study analysed the ideology, background, personalities, and policies of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). This study provides Corps PSYOP personnel with an overview of the PRG and outlines vulnerabilities for exploitation purposes. The three other studies, following the same format as the first, were: VC Taxation, Recruiting and Training. These included suggested ways to disrupt the enemy's effectiveness in these areas.

c. Operations. Planning for support of the 1970 Tet Campaign started with IFFV conducting a meeting for all Assistant Province Advisors/PSYOP on 12 August 1969. The advisors participating in the meeting were requested to urge their counterparts to start planning for Tet. On 12 August 1969, advisors and Vietnamese counterparts attended a II Corps PSYOP Coordinating Committee meeting at which time the tentative Tet Support Plan was explained and support concepts were discussed. Support requirements were determined and transmitted to the 4th PSYOP Group. During September and October, coordination was made with the 4th PSYOP Group to determine delivery dates for requested material and to ascertain themes and quantities of national material for dissemination in the II Corps Tactical Zone. The 8th PSYOP Battalion printing resources have been analyzed and an input schedule has been developed. Firm requirements will be placed on Assistant Province Advisors/PSYOP at an upcoming IFFV PSYOP Conference. The 8th PSYOP Battalion and IFFV MIL/PSYCP are waiting for the MACV Support Plan so that a supporting plan can be developed.

A campaign to counter Viet Cong rice confiscation moved into the dissemination stage during the reporting period. Propaganda material printed by the 4th PSYOP Group was available in sufficient quantity by mid-August to start Corps-wide aerial dissemination. The central targeting concept used in the campaign was indorsed by IFFV and accepted by the Assistant Province Advisors/PSYCP. Since the campaign started, over three hundred targets have been flown and several Province Advisor have augmented the standard material with leaflets tailored to their rice growing areas. Initial feedback on the program has been encouraging.

Five printed items have been developed to exploit US troop reduction. Media has also been developed, on a contingency basis, to enable rapid reaction to future troop reduction announcements. Material

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already disseminated has been confined to factual announcements of the withdrawal and general publicity of the increased competence of the RVNAF. To develop a photographic library to support this program, a field photo team is visiting every major Vietnamese training center and installation in II Corps. In addition, it has accompanied Vietnamese units on combat operations. The 8th PSYOP Battalion is currently attempting to obtain pictures of Viet Cong training activities so a photographic comparison can be made between tactically oriented RVNAF training and the political indoctrination oriented VC training.

d. Logistics. With the curtailment of minor new construction during the latter part of July, the battalion resubmitted a Job Order Request for a new printing facility. The request was approved by the 4th PSYOP Group Commander and forwarded for final approval. The USARV Facilities Review Board inspected the existing printing facility on 25 September 1969. The Job Order Request was returned disapproved by the Deputy Commanding General, USARV. The Facilities Review Board recommended that the 8th PSYOP Battalion coordinate with the Nha Trang Installation Coordinator to determine the availability of suitable facilities to satisfy the requirement. A Job Order Request is now being prepared to air-condition the present printing plant, as no other suitable facility has been located.

During the month of October an Interservice Support Agreement was initiated by the 8th PSYOP Battalion requesting logistic and maintenance support from the Tuy Hoa Air Base Maintenance Section for the Battalion's Air Operations Section. The Interservice Support Agreement is pending approval by USARV and HQ, 7th Air Force.

2. Section II - Lessons Learned.

a Item: Authorization to draw film.

OBSERVATION: PSYOP Battalions have been drawing their film supply from the 4th PSYOP Group. Occasionally, 4th PSYOP Group has not been able to supply the quantity of film required. It would be to the advantage of each battalion to draw film from their Direct Support Unit (DSU).

EVALUATION: Authorization for the 8th PSYOP Battalion to draw film from its Direct Support Unit has been granted by the USA Inventory Control Center. By requisitioning film from the DSU, the 8th PSYOP Battalion

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is able to requisition the quantity of film needed for monthly requirements. This will ease the demand placed on 4th PSYOP Group.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that each PSYOP Battalion submit a request for authorization to draw film to the Headquarters, US Army Inventory Control Center; ATTN: AVCA-ICC-SM-EL, APO In-country 96384. The request must include complete justification and quantity of film required.

4. Item: PSYOP information available at district level.

OBSERVATION: There is a great deal of information available at district level concerning activities and situations which would be useful for planning special PSYOP campaigns; however, much of this information is not normally known to higher headquarters.

EVALUATION: The lack of knowledge, training and understanding of information needed for PSYOPs at district level hinders the flow of such information to higher headquarters.

RECOMMENDATION: Detailed coordination should be carried out at district level prior to the initiation of a special campaign in the area. Such coordination will insure that special campaigns generated at Corps USARV/MACV are built around the specific needs and ideas of the people in that area.

5. Item: Improving the quality of media development field requests.

OBSERVATION: A significant percentage of media development requests submitted by field teams and province advisory personnel are originated or developed by ARVN S5 or Vietnamese Information Service counterparts, who possess limited knowledge of JUSPAO guidances of MACV directives. For these reasons, many requests from the field must be altered or rejected.

EVALUATION: Returning a rejected or altered request to a US Advisor often places him in the uncomfortable position of having to inform a counterpart that his propaganda efforts have been found wanting by other Americans.

RECOMMENDATION: That POLWAR representatives in the PSYOP Coordination Center reject or alter inferior requests and explain the reasons

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for changes or rejections over their signature and office seal.

d. Item: Improved feedback on media development requests.

OBSERVATION: In the past, the only automatic feedback on the status of media requests was the return of one copy of the PSYOP Support Request (4th PSYOP Group Form 25) to the requestor after the job was received and logged in the S3 Work Status Journal. This procedure notified the customer that the request was received and gave him the 8th PSYOP Battalion's job number as a reference for future queries.

EVALUATION: This procedure is deficient in that it does not notify the customer when the printing job is completed, nor does it furnish copies of the finished product.

RECOMMENDATION: In addition to notifying the requestor of receipt of his request, the PSYOP Battalions send copies of the final product to the originator immediately after printing.

e. Item: Slow reporting of national and international news to village level.

OBSERVATIONS: Field Teams report that many villagers have questions on local, national and international news because they are unable to get prompt delivery of newspapers, or are in areas of poor radio reception. Questions concerning "Why are US troops leaving Viet Nam" and US policy are asked by villagers.


EVALUATION: VC propaganda is effective when given to villagers who lack correct information or when VC propaganda may be the only information received in the village.

RECOMMENDATION: Team leaders translate article from the "Stars and Stripes" and have the translation taped for loudspeaker broadcasting. In addition, field teams should tape radio broadcasts in good reception areas and replay the tapes in outlying villages and hamlets.

1 Incl:
8th PSYOP Bn
Organization Chart

Marlin C. Lang
MARLIN C. LANG
LTC, Armor
Commanding

8TH PSYOP BATTALION ORGANIZATION



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Incl 1 to Incl 4

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96215

AVGM-10C

15 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 10th Psychological Operations Battalion
for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section I - Operations: Significant Activities

a. Personnel: During the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969, the Battalion received 5 officers and 12 enlisted men. During the same period 12 officers and 46 enlisted men departed.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) This report covers a period of 92 days, 13 of which were devoted to training.

(2) Prior to 10 October 1969, the Binh Thuy-based "C" Flight, 5th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), provided all aerial psycop support in IV CTZ. On that date, "C" Flight was abruptly deactivated, and its mission assumed by "B" Flight, 9th SOS, based in Bien Hoa, III CTZ. On 18 October 1969, a meeting was conducted at II Field Force Headquarters to determine the distribution of these reduced aerial assets between III and IV Corps, and methods of employing them. As a result of that meeting, IV CTZ presently receives one C-47 leaflet mission every other day, one C-47 night loudspeaker mission per week, and two O-2B missions per day. Under this agreement, both III and IV Corps receive approximately equal amounts of available flight time. It was further agreed that utilization of assets may require subsequent review and/or revision of this initial working agreement. This provision applies particularly to the night loudspeaker missions, and is contingent upon the early acquisition by the 9th SOS of navigational equipment which will permit flying such missions with the O-2B aircraft. Scheduling of aircraft is done in a manner that assures that one aircraft is always airborne between 0800 and 1600 hours, thus providing a constant quick-reaction capability for IV CTZ. A system for diverting missions as required has been developed utilising IV CTZ flight control facilities. Success of the full utilization of the limited air resources in III and IV CTZ's is primarily due to the close coordination achieved between the 6th and 10th PSYOP Battalions, and the excellent support provided by the 9th SOS.

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(3) On 21 October 1969, a joint center for psyop air support was initiated with the cooperation of the POLWAR Bloc (VN) and the 10th PSYOP Bn. The Vietnamese psyop assets are furnished by the 116th Liaison Squadron at Binh Thuy and the 35th Wing at Tan Son Nhut. Their current psyop assets consist of four U-17 and one L-20 missions per day. The goal of the joint center for psyop air support is to achieve joint scheduling of aircraft, pooling of air assets to achieve maximum utilization of psyop aircraft, and to provide an immediate reaction capability Corps-wide.

(a) The first objective was achieved on 31 October 1969 when a joint U.S.-Vietnamese psyop air schedule was published by CORDS/PSYOP.

(b) The second objective has also been achieved. Mission requests are pooled and aircraft are assigned to fly the mission on basis of utility and capability, irrespective of whether the requestor is U.S. or Vietnamese. The result is more efficient utilization of available air assets. Generally, strategic leaflet missions involving large quantity drops are assigned to a USAF C-47. Smaller strategic leaflet drops are assigned to VNAF L-20. Speaker missions north of the Bassac River are normally assigned to USAF O-2B due to the location of their staging area. Speaker missions south of the Bassac River are given to VNAF U-17's.

(c) The goal of a Corps-wide immediate reaction capability has not yet been realized. The following accomplishments have been made, however:

(1) A system for immediate diversion of USAF aircraft has been established. This system involves the use of IV CTZ air traffic control, but is only effective during the time the aircraft is airborne and operating in IV CTZ. No similar system has yet been established for diversion of VNAF aircraft.

(2) Through the combined efforts of the 14th Wing (USAF) and the 10th PSYOP Bn, components were successfully fitted to the U-17 speaker aircraft of the 116th Liaison Squadron, giving them for the first time "Earlyword" and "Quick Tape" capabilities. The system was explained in detail to the Squadron Commander and his advisor. In addition, a fact sheet was distributed in both English and Vietnamese describing the "Earlyword" and "Quick Tape" operation (See Inclosure 1).

(3) U.S. frequencies have been and will continue to be provided for VNAF PSYWAR pilots to assist them with radio contact with psychological operations personnel in the field. This contact is mandatory for effective aerial psyop support.

(d) The total combined air effort has progressed markedly in the short time it has been in existence. The third objective, quick-reaction, will soon be realized, and refinement of the entire operation will continue.

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(4) During this reporting period, aerial loudspeaker and leaflet missions in support of pacification have been flown on a continuous basis. Airborne tactical psychological operations were frequently utilized throughout IV CTZ. The most significant results were obtained during a mission in support of a K-Bar Operation, a Regional Force (RF) tactical operation, in Phong Dinh Province on 11 October 1969. An O-2B, working in close coordination with the assault commander, played a special tape and made several "Earlyword" broadcasts over the area of operations. Five Hoi Chanh were directly attributed to this operation.

(5) The 10th PSYOP Bn and POLMAR Bloc (VN) completed coordination to merge their propaganda operations into a combined propaganda operations center (CPOC) in November 1969. The CPOC will be commanded by a Vietnamese field grade officer. The deputy will be a U.S. officer in the grade of captain. The remaining elements of the center will be jointly staffed with Vietnamese and U.S. personnel. Once the center is operational all requests for psyop support in IV CTZ will be channeled into the center. The center will completely process the requests, from development thru printing and dissemination. In addition to processing psyop requests, the center will receive for evaluation copies of all propaganda produced by other agencies and which is disseminated in IV CTZ. The combined propaganda operation center will greatly enhance the total psyop effort in IV CTZ. It will enable the Vietnamese to learn the 10th PSYOP Bn mission and provide the ARVN the capability of assuming that mission in the event U.S. forces are redeployed.

(6) Psychological operations in IV CTZ are currently being directed against NVA soldiers, both to members of NVA units and to fillers in VC main and local force units. In the past it was believed that the NVA are less susceptible to psyop in the VC, particularly to Chieu Hoi appeals. Within IV CTZ, however, psychological operations against NVA target audiences are increasing. This increased emphasis is due, in part, to reported changes in status of NVA soldiers infiltrating IV CTZ. These changes include: Decrease in average age, increased percentage of draftees, limited prior training and indoctrination, and deterioration of morale. (Reference: JIC, IV CTZ DMAC, and interrogation reports on file with S-2, 10th PSYOP Bn.)

(a) While NVA personnel in their own units are still believed to be less susceptible to direct Chieu Hoi appeals, they are being made the target of general appeals such as those offering rewards for weapons, favorable treatment of POW's, and questioning the fate of NVA soldiers wounded in battle. In addition, surrender leaflets have been dropped on NVA targets in Kien Giang, Chau Doc, and Dinh Tuong Provinces.

(b) In response to requests from units in contact with the NVA, the 10th PSYOP Bn is currently using JUSPAO leaflets #2966-71, dealing with POW treatment and camp life. Hoi Chanh exploitation tapes have also been used

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recently against NVA targets. On 14 October 1969, an NVA soldier from a unit which had lost 31 men in contact with an ARVN unit in Kien Phong Province, rallied to the GVN and made a tape which was broadcast to his unit.

(c) The Testing and Evaluation Section of the 10th PSYOP Bn, PDS is currently conducting a survey of NVA and VC Hoi Chanh at the Regional Chieu Hoi Center in Can Tho to determine what animosities, if any, exist between these groups.

(d) The 10th PSYOP Bn is preparing a leaflet, 10-364-69, appealing to enemy soldiers not to follow Communist cadre. This leaflet can be easily adapted to NVA target audiences.

(7) Extensive testing of a leaflet series designed to motivate the reader toward the advantages of weapons reward through the use of visual association was successfully completed. The series related one object to another. For example - "If you turn in an AK-47 to the GVN, the money you would receive will enable you to purchase a pig." Or "A weapons cache will enable you to buy a buffalo." The series has been disseminated as a mix.

(8) During this reporting period, interest in the Phung Hoang (Phoenix) program has increased throughout IV CTZ. This unit has established a priority II for all psyop request support for the program. The following is an excerpt from a report submitted by APA/PSYOP in Kien Phong Province:

"The resultant wanted poster was an outstanding example of really professional work by the 10th PSYOP Bn. Within ten days it was in the hands of Phung Hoang Committee and ready for distribution.

"Two days after receipt of the posters, they were being distributed by RD cadre in Cao Lanh District when the number one man on the poster was spotted. He was immediately arrested and brought to Cao Lanh District town for questioning. Three days later three men rallied as Hoi Chanh. Later a fifth man on the wanted poster was captured. This rapid and unusual success has firmly convinced the Phung Hoang Committee of Kien Phong Province of the value of the wanted poster program."

Subsequently, posters have been produced for other provinces.

(9) Due to the reductions of field teams in IV CTZ, two quick-reaction exploitation teams have been created. Each team consists of two personnel, one U.S. Interrogator, language qualified, and one Vietnamese. The teams are on standby for rapid deployment to any location in IV CTZ. The teams carry recorders and cameras to enable them to exploit all situations. Once a team has departed for the purpose of quick-reaction psyop exploitation, one 1250 press is readied to support the operation.

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(10) Three copies of the 15 minute film "The Chieu Hoi Story" have been produced by JUSPAO. The theme is the life of one Hoi Chanh from the time he rallies to the time he returns to a normal life in Vietnamese society. The main and supporting roles were portrayed by authentic Hoi Chanh. Most of the scenes were filmed at the Can Tho Regional Chieu Hoi Center. One sequence was filmed in Vinh Long Province at an outpost where the main character actually rallied. These copies will be field tested by various field teams and if the testing proves satisfactory, additional copies will be made for distribution.

d. Logistics: None

2. Section II - Lessons Learned

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) In mid September 1969, the 10th PSYOP Bn initiated a comprehensive study to determine a better and more efficient means of leaflet dissemination. Guidance in the techniques of leaflet dissemination was provided by the Low, Medium and High Altitude Dissemination Guide, produced by the 7th PSYOP Group, and FM 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. The problem was to develop a more precise method of dropping only the number of leaflets required to achieve the desired density on target (See inclosure 2).

(2) The 10th PSYOP Bn has been using the Delayed Opening Leaflet (DOL) method to target specific enemy units or hamlets. The DOL is a very effective method of aerial leaflet dissemination because it is designed to conform to specifications and needs of a particular psyop mission. The accuracy of this method makes its use ideal for psychological operations that are tactical or sensitive in nature (See Inclosure 3).

(3) Contact was made with the Director of the Chieu Hoi Division of CORDS/DMAC, IV CTZ, and the Returnee Liaison Officer, for information on the current status of Chieu Hoi follow-up in IV CTZ. The following observations and conclusions are made:

(a) While follow-up is presently recognized as the major problem area of the Chieu Hoi Program, no organization is now primarily responsible for follow-up, nor are funds currently allocated for this work. As a result, very little effort is being applied in that area.

(b) During 1966, request was made to the GVN for separate funding of a Chieu Hoi follow-up program. The request was denied. During late 1967 and 1968, U.S. funds were made available through AIK and Special Fund 68-4 for the hiring of follow-up teams composed of ex-Hoi Chanh. These teams were considered successful by the Director, but late in 1968, no more funds were approved.

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(e) District Chieu Hoi cadre and APT's are now relied upon for follow-up information, though neither has the primary mission for it. Some individual ex-Hoi Chanh are also credited with providing information.

(d) By GVN decree of 1 April 1969, the combined office of Chieu Hoi Cadre/Information Chief was established at village and hamlet level. Such a person could be expected to participate in follow-up activities, but he takes direction from two chains of command leading from the now separate ministries of Chieu Hoi and Information. Consequently, his effectiveness in Chieu Hoi activities is considered doubtful.

(e) During the period 20 Aug to 20 Sep 69, 2,999 follow-up contacts were reported in IV CTZ. No elaboration has been made on these contacts, and it must be emphasized, the figure is considered unreliable for two reasons: (1) The district Chieu Hoi cadre are not believed to be actually going into the villages and hamlets to pursue contacts and: (2) different APT's are reporting contact with the same Hoi Chanh. This unreliability places most of the follow-up information except that dealing with military service, GVN employment, and private employment, into serious question.

(f) The Chieu Hoi Division, CORDS, recommends future assignment of responsibility for Chieu Hoi follow-up to either the National Police or the Census Grievance Committee, which operates under the Office of Strategic Affairs of the U.S. Embassy. In either case, adequate funds and personnel are available for the assignment. Assignment of the responsibility to the National Police is considered preferable because follow-up is an aspect of population control, already a National Police function.

c. Training and Organization: During this period the 10th PSYOP Bn has continued to conduct a training program for personnel of the 40th POLWAR Battalion. Presently, there are twenty-seven personnel being trained in the following printing courses:

<u>COURSE TITLE/MOS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>
Offset Pressman/MOS 83F	19
Offset Platemaker/MOS 83E	6
Varitypist/MOS 71B	1
Process Photographer/MOS 83D	1

d. Intelligence: None

e. Logistics: None


f. Organization: None

g. Psychological Operations Development: None

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for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)


JAMES R WARREN
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

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2-CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: CROP-DT, APO 96558
3-HQ, USARV, ATTN: AVHOC-DST
20-HQ, 4th PSYOP Gp, ATTN: AVGM-C, APO 96243

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96215

AVGM-10C

28 October 1969

SUBJECT: Earlyword and Quick Tape

1. General:

a. The "Earlyword" system enables any transmission received on the aircraft's radios to be rebroadcast over the plane's loudspeaker.


b. The "Quick Tape" system enables any transmission received on the aircraft's radios to be recorded for later rebroadcast.

2. Purpose:

a. The "Earlyword" will enable a Hoi Chanh to speak directly to his comrades without the delay of making a tape or landing the aircraft, thus making the Chieu Hoi appeal more effective. The Earlyword system is limited by the range of the radios used by the ground broadcaster and the reception clarity of the aircraft radio. In the Delta, effective "Earlyword" broadcasts have been made when the distance separating the ground broadcaster and the aircraft have been in excess of 20 kilometers. The radio normally used for these broadcasts is the PRC-25, although any radio compatible with any of the aircraft radios could be used.

b. The "Earlyword" permits a Province, District, or other official to talk to a great number of his constituents about timely matters without incurring delays in making a tape and landing the aircraft. This capability could prove critical on such projects as epidemic control.

c. The "Quick Tape" will permit any of the above broadcast uses even though the target of the broadcast is located beyond the range limits of "Earlyword". The message can be taped while the aircraft circles in the proximity of the message originator. Once the message is recorded the aircraft can fly to any targeted area and broadcast the message over the aircraft loudspeakers. The plane is not required to land to pick up a special tape which makes the system especially useful in areas with inadequate landing facilities, and when timeliness is essential. The following illustrations show the capabilities of the "Earlyword" system and instructions on how it is placed into operations:




1. Message broadcast from ground and from speaker simultaneously

Incl 1 to Incl 5


AVGM-10C

SUBJECT: Earlyword and Quick Tape


28 October 1969




1. Aircraft records message 2. Aircraft flies to location 3. Aircraft broadcasts message



A. Interphone-Headset T-Connector



B. Interphone-Speaker Patch



C. Interphone-Recorder Patch

Earlyword

1. Male end of "A" is inserted into normal interphone input.
2. Headset is inserted into input of "A".
3. "B" is inserted into the patch input on "A".
4. Alligator clips on "B" are inserted into aircraft amplifier inputs.
5. With speakers operating, any transmission heard by the headset will be broadcast.

Quick Tape

1. Male end of "A" is connected into normal interphone input.
2. Headset is inserted into input of "A".
3. "C" is then inserted into patch input on "A".
4. "C" is then inserted into monitor input on recorder.
5. Any transmission received by the headset will be recorded when recorder is operating.

Summary

3. Summary:

a. The Earlyword-Quick Tape system is simple, yet effective. The operator on the ground need only be familiar with standard radio procedure and a few basic rules to use the system correctly. The ground operator must:

- (1) Insure the message length is no longer than 30 seconds.
- (2) Speak slowly and clearly.
- (3) Repeat the message frequently.

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b. The Earlyword-Quick Tape systems in no way encumbers the aircraft. The components are easily connected, even while the aircraft is airborne.

c. This system has been in use by the 10th PSYOP Bn since May, 1969. It has proved to be an extremely valuable aid to the psyoperator in the field and has produced tangible psyop results in the form of Hoi Chanh.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96215

AVGM-10C

25 October 1969

SUBJECT: The Leaflet Bundle Method of Aerial Delivery

1. General

a. In mid September 1969, the 10th PSYOP Bn initiated a comprehensive study to determine a better and more efficient means of leaflet dissemination. Guidance in the techniques of leaflet dissemination was provided by the Low, Medium and High Altitude Dissemination Guide, produced by the 7th PSYOP Group, and FM 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures. The problem was to develop a more precise method of dropping only the number of leaflets required to achieve the desired density on target.

b. The process of solving this problem, it was determined that one C-47, loaded with 60 leaflet boxes, is capable of adequately covering 480 targets per mission if there is some uniform means of releasing a specified number of leaflets per target.

c. In order to accomplish this, the Battalion S-3 Air section developed the "Leaflet Bundle" method of aerial dissemination.

2. The Leaflet Bundle Method

a. The Leaflet Bundle Method is basically the concept of wrapping leaflets into bundles that contain the precise number of leaflets required to effectively cover a target. The leaflets are instantaneously released from the aircraft at medium altitude, usually 3,000 feet, so as to affect the most suitable pattern when they hit the ground.

b. The Leaflet Bundle Method was designed for use in large scale strategic leaflet campaigns. The bundle will contain standard leaflets which have a general propaganda message intended for repeated use throughout the operations area. The use of the bundle allows for the coverage of vast areas, with the maximum exposure to our messages, and the minimum amount of waste of our media. In short, the Bundle Method eliminates supersaturation.

3. Characteristics of the Bundle Method

a. The characteristics of the Bundle Method in general are as follows:

(1) The bundle is simply a wrapped package of leaflets. It is not tied or securely bound in any way.

) The bundle is designed so that the leaflets are instantaneously released from the aircraft, utilizing the "Distributed Cluster Release" method of

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delivery.

(3) The size of the bundle is computed from the guidelines and formulas contained in the Low, Medium and High Altitude Dissemination Guide, sections I, II and III revised. The major considerations are what size leaflet pattern will be achieved, and how many leaflets will be needed to effectively cover the patterns, (see sections I, and II of the Dissemination Guide for examples).

b. The characteristics of the Bundle Method used in the IV CTZ by the 10th PSYCO Bn are as follows:

(1) The leaflets are instantaneously released from the bundle at 3,000 feet altitude. The leaflets cover a pattern on the ground of approximately 9,500 meters by 500 meters (approximately 4.5 square kilometers).

(2) The bundle contains approximately 4,000 3x6x20 leaflets. Its dimensions are approximately 9 inches in length, 6 inches in width and 4.5 inches in depth. The 4,000 leaflet figure is based on the change to section III of the Dissemination Guide, which states that an average of 775 leaflets per square kilometer is applicable for use in Vietnam.

(Note the 4,000 leaflet figure allows for approximately 10% margin of error, such as unpredicted wind changes).

c. The purpose of this paper is not to instruct on how to compute leaflet densities or leaflet pattern sizes. This has already been accomplished in the Dissemination Guide. The purpose of this paper is to describe a method of achieving the proper densities once they have been computed. The Leaflet Bundle Method is a practical, efficient means of accomplishing this goal.

4. The Preparation of the Leaflet Bundle

a. The leaflet bundle is simple and economical to prepare. The materials needed are leaflets, a roll of wrapping paper and a leaflet measuring device. The following is a step by step explanation on how to construct the bundle:

(1) First construct a leaflet measuring device or mold; a three sided box with the capacity for the leaflets you desire in your bundle is suggested. (A sample mold constructed of cardboard and heavy tape is shown in illustration A).

(2) Cut the wrapping paper into lengths large enough to entirely encompass your leaflet measuring device or mold.

(3) Fill your mold with leaflets, and dump them into the paper (See illustrations B and C).

(4) Wrap the leaflets as you would an ordinary gift package without tying it (See illustration D).

(5) Box the bundles, and you are ready for your mission. (One box will contain approximately 8 bundles, See illustration E).

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(6) Fill as many boxes as your aircraft can carry, (A C-47 carries 60 boxes or 480 bundles), and figure one bundle per target (A target is equivalent to the leaflet pattern you achieve, see illustration F).

(7) Many aerial disseminated leaflets in Vietnam are being dropped from C-47 aircraft. A four man crew can prepare 480 bundles in 4-5 hours.

5. Advantages of the Leaflet Bundle Method

a. Economy:

(1) The Leaflet Bundle Method is capable of greatly lowering the cost of aerial leaflet drops. One leaflet mission is now capable of doing the same job it took eight missions to do previous to the Bundle Method. For example, a C-47 load of 60 boxes normally covered sixty 9,500x500 meter leaflet patterns, for a total area of approximately three 10x10 kilometer grid squares. With the Bundle Method it is now possible to cover four hundred and eighty 9,500x500 meter leaflet patterns, for a total area of approximately twenty-four (24) 10x10 kilometer grid squares.

(2) Hitting more targets with the same amount of leaflets can also lower printing requirements. In the past when a requestor asked for a printing job, he usually planned on using one box per target. Therefore, he requested huge quantities of leaflets. Now that the requestor only needs 1/8 as many leaflets, the printing sections will be able to increase the number of customers they satisfy. This will help eliminate the great backlog of requests that often overloads the printing sections.

b. Efficiency:



(1) Utilizing the Bundle Method will decrease the time required to cover an area by eight times, (using the '-47 as a guide).

(2) The targets will be covered with enough leaflets to effectively put our message across. Leaflet waste will be eliminated.

6. Conclusions

a. The Leaflet Bundle Method is a technique designed to provide the required density for a specific type of terrain using the 3"x6", 20 weight leaflet. Although the examples used here apply to IV Corps Tactical Zone in South Vietnam specifically, the principle of the Bundle Method can be adopted to fit any terrain in the world, using any type aircraft and any leaflet with a known drop characteristic.

b. Prior planning, to include per drop computation, bundling and detailed target designation will save money and man hours in the long run.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96215

AVGM-1CC

21 October 1969

SUBJECT: The Delayed Opening Leaflet (DOL) Method of Aerial Delivery

1. GENERAL

a. For psychological operations to be effective, the psyoperator must have a means of getting his propaganda message to his audience. Of all the means of dissemination available, aerial leaflet dissemination is often the only means of reaching the target audience.

b. Of all the known techniques of aerial leaflet dissemination employed, the Delayed Opening Leaflet (DOL) method is one of the most effective. However, since only a few people in psyop are aware of the capabilities and specifics of the DOL, it is also one of the least commonly used methods of aerial leaflet dissemination.

2. THE DOL METHOD

a. The DOL is basically a small bundle of leaflets with a release mechanism attached. It is designed to be dropped from an aircraft at high altitudes, with the intent of falling intact to a desired altitude before the leaflets are released from the bundle.

b. The DOL method was designed to conform to the specifications and needs of a particular psyop mission. It is to be used on psychological operations that require a leaflet drop, but are confined in both the theme and area they are to cover. For example, the DOL would be used in targeting a specific enemy unit with the intent of exploiting weaknesses or situations that apply specifically to that unit. Another example would be when targeting a specific hamlet with a leaflet that has a theme applicable only to that hamlet. In short, the DOL is used for psychological operations which are tactical or sensitive in nature.

3. THE PREPARATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DOL

a. The characteristics of the DOL presently being used in IV CTZ are as follows:

(1) The DOL used in IV CTZ is made up of approximately 1,000 3x6x20 standard leaflets. Its dimensions are approximately 3 inches in width, 6 inches in length, and 3.75 inches in height (3.75 inches of 3x6x20 leaflets equal approximately 1,000 leaflets).

(2) The DOL has a 7.25 inch length of time fuze with fuze lighter attached. When dropped from 3,000 feet this length fuze causes the bundle to detonate within 300 - 500 feet above the ground.

(3) When the leaflets are released at 500 feet, the bundle will cover a pattern on the ground of approximately 2,250 meters by 80 meters. This compares to a pattern of 9,500 meters by 500 meters when leaflets are released from 3,000 feet above the ground.

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b. The DOL is simple and economical to prepare. The only materials needed are 1,000 3x6x20 standard leaflets, plastic or nylon cord (cotton cord will absorb moisture and may cause a malfunction), and standard Army time fuze. For best results, an expendable mechanical fuze lighter should be used to light the fuze (a match head affixed to the end of the fuze can be used as an expedient fuze lighter). The following is a step by step explanation on constructing the DOL (see attached illustrations):

(1) First cut the time fuze to an appropriate length. Since there is no data available at present, test dropping is our only means of determining what length to cut the fuze for different size DOLs and bursting altitudes. For example, a 7.25 inch (30 sec) length of fuze will cause a 1,000 leaflet DOL of 3x6x20 leaflets dropped from 3,000 feet to detonate at 300 - 500 feet; but a 2,000 leaflet DOL of the same leaflets, with the same intended use, will require a different length of fuze. (See illustration A)

(2) Punch a hole into one end of the fuze large enough for the nylon cord to be threaded through it. (See illustration B)

(3) Thread the plastic or nylon cord through the hole in the fuze. (See illustration C)

(4) Taking the cord with the fuze attached, tie the leaflets together as you would an ordinary package. Be sure that only one strand of the cord is threaded through the eye of the fuze, since more than one will prevent the fuze from burning through. (See illustration D)

(5) Attach the fuze lighter and the DOL is ready for use. (See illustrations E & F)

c. The DOL functions in a very simple manner. The fuze is ignited and the DOL is ejected from the aircraft. When the fuze burns down to the cord, the cord is severed and the leaflets are released.

4. ADVANTAGES OF THE DOL

(1) Accuracy - Because of its size and weight, the DOL is affected very little by the wind. Therefore, it can be placed on the target very quickly and accurately.

(2) Size - The DOL is small and can be utilized by light aircraft. This is especially good when the targets are not justifiably large enough to economically require a large aircraft.

(3) Economy - The materials needed to make the DOL are very inexpensive and easily acquired. Also, the DOL contains a small but appropriate amount of leaflets, which results in a minimum of leaflets wasted.

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(4) Flexibility - The DOL can be set to open at any altitude, which enables the psyoperators to adjust the size of the leaflet pattern he desires.


(5) Safety - The pilot can achieve the same size leaflet patterns and accuracy when flying at high altitudes, that would otherwise require him to fly at dangerously low altitudes.

(6) Effectiveness - The small leaflet pattern of the DOL allows the psyoperator to isolate his message when isolation is necessary.


5. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of psyop is not to inundate the people with sheer bulk, it is to expose them to messages which have some psychological significance. It cannot be overstressed that quality is far more important than quantity, and persuasiveness is more important than sheer exposure. The DOL can greatly aid the psyoperator in effectively achieving the above purpose.


Preparation of the DOL



E



F



ILLUSTRATIONS:

- A. Cut the time fuze to an appropriate length.
- B. Punch a hole into one end of the fuze.
- C. Thread the cord through the hole in the fuze.
- D. Tie the bundle together.
- E. Attach the igniting device.
- F. The finished DOL used in IV CTZ.

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